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THE CRY OF WOLFISH IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: THE FUTURE OF
FEDERAL JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN PRISON ADMINISTRATION
IRA P. ROBBINS*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Bell v. Wolfish,' the United States Supreme
Court held that, with respect to conditions or
restrictions having no specific constitutional source
for protection, a pretrial detainee in a federal
correctional center has a right under the due
process clause of the fifth amendment to be free
from any punitive conditions or restrictions during
detention.2 The Court further held that all of the
challenged practices and conditions were valid be-
cause they were rationally related to the legitimate
nonpunitive purposes of the detention center.3
Thus, the correctional facility could place two
detainees in a cell built for one,4 prohibit receipt of
books and magazines except directly from publish-
ers ("publisher-only" rule),5 limit gift packages to
one package of food at Christmas,6 conduct unan-
nounced searches of the living areas outside of the
inmates' presence, 7 and conduct visual anal and
genital searches for contraband after every contact
visit, without probable cause.
8
Apart from its impact on the rights of detainees,
9
Wolfish has virtually blocked any potential expan-
sion of prisoners' rights by the Supreme Court for
the near future. The purpose of this Article is to
examine the lower federal court decisions rendered
* Professor of Law, The American University, Wash-
ington College of Law; A.B., University of Pennsylvania,
1970; J.D., Harvard University, 1973.
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'441 U.S. 520 (1979).
2 Id. at 535.
3 Id. at 538-41, 560-61.
4 Id at 541.
5 Id. at 550.6 Id. at 553-55.
7 Id. at 557.
8 Id. at 560.
9 Prior to Wolfish, a few lower federal courts had ruled
that pretrial detainees were subject only to those restric-
tions which were a natural product of confinement or
were necessary to ensure the presence of the detainees at
their trial. See, e.g., Norris v. Frame, 585 F.2d 1183 (3d
Cir. 1978); Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1978).
re'd sub non. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
in the period since Wolfish to determine whether
judicial relief remains available in the federal sys-
tem for prisoners' claims. To do so, it will be
necessary first to explore the evolution of judicial
intervention in correctional reform during the
1970s and the relationship of Wolfish to earlier
Supreme Court decisions influential in defining the
scope ofjudicial intervention in prison administra-
tion.
II. BACKGROUND
Until the past ten to fifteen years, a majority of
state and federal courts followed a policy of declin-
ing jurisdiction over most litigation involving
prisons. This policy, now generally referred to as
the "hands-off" doctrine,10 originally reflected the
view that a convicted prisoner was a "slave of the
State,"" without enforceable rights. Despite the
eventual rejection of the slave theory, courts con-
tinued to apply the hands-off doctrine strictly,
absent exceptional circumstances raising questions
of cruel and unusual punishment. 12 Even when
exceptional circumstances existed, the courts often
invoked the doctrine. As a practical matter, then,
prisoners had no judicial forum for relief."3
1o Commentators believe the term "hands-off doctrine"
originated in Fritch, Civil Rights of Federal Prison In-
mates (1961) (document prepared for the United States
Dept. of Prisons).
"l Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790,
796 (1871).
12 See Berger, Withdrawal of Rights and Due Deference: The
New Hands-Off Policy in Correctional Litigation, 47 U.M.K.C.
L. REv. 1, 2 (1978).
13 See generally Haas, Judicial Politics and Correctional Re-
form: An Analysis of the Decline of the Hands-Off Doctrine,
1977 DEr. COLL. L. REV. 795, 796 (1977). Language
employed by the courts to express the hands-off doctrine
remained consistent through the years:
We do not think it right to interfere with the
jailer in the exercise of the discretion vested in him,
as to the security of the prisoners. Ex parte Taws,
23 F. Cas. 725 (1809).
The courts have no function to superintend the
treatment of prisoners in the penitentiary, but only
to deliver from prison those who are illegally de-
tained there. State ex re. Renner v. Wright, 188
Md. 189, 51 A.2d 668 (1946) (quoting Sarshik v.
Sanford, 142 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1944)).
Courts are without power to supervise prison
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A. RATIONALES FOR THE HANDS-OFF DOCTRINE
Courts and commentators have offered several
rationales for nonintervention: separation of pow-
ers; federalism; judicial inexpertise; subversion of
prison discipline; the flood of litigation;' 4 fear of
creating instability in prison management; 5 and
conserving the public fisc.16 The first four of these
considerations are discussed below.
The separation of powers rationale consists of
two theories. First is the basic argument that con-
trol over prison management lies exclusively with
the legislative branch of government. 17 A corollary
to this reasoning is the delegation doctrine, by
which federal and state statutes delegate exclusive
responsibility for administration of prisons to the
administration or to interfere with the ordinary
rules and regulations.... No authorities are needed
to support that statement. Banning v. Looney, 213
F.2d 771 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 859 (1954).
Responsible prison administration is not subject
to judicial review in the absence of actions consti-
tuting clear abuse or caprice upon the part of prison
officials. Breier v. Raines, 221 Kan. 439, 440, 559
P.2d 813, 814 (1977).
14 See Haas, supra note 13, at 821-29.
'5 See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408 (1974).
See also Kaufman, Prison: TheJudge's Dilemma, 41 FORDHAM
L. REV. 495, 507 (1973).
16 See Eisenberg & Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraor-
dinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465, 506-
07 (1980). Typically, courts refuse to accept lack of funds
as an excuse for noncompliance with federal constitu-
tional standards. Probably the strongest-and most often
cited-statement on this point is the following:
Let there be no mistake in the matter; the obli-
gation of the Respondents to eliminate existing
unconstitutionalities does not depend upon what
the Legislature may do, or, indeed, upon what
Respondents may actually be able to accomplish. If
Arkansas is going to operate a penitentiary system,
it is going to have to be a system that is counte-
nanced by the Constitution of the United States.
Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 385 (E.D. Ark. 1970),
affld, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971). Accord, Pugh v. Locke,
406 F. Supp. 318, 330 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd and remanded
sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir.
1977), remanded with instructions sub nom. Alabama v. Pugh,
438 U.S. 781 (1978) ("a state is not at liberty to afford its
citizens only those constitutional rights which fit com-
fortably within its budget"). See also Finney v. Arkansas
Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194, 201 (8th Cir. 1974);
Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 1211, 1292-93
(E.D.N.Y. 1978); Vest v. Lubbock County Comm'rs
Court, 444 F. Supp. 824,834 (N.D. Tex. 1977); Frug, The
Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 725-26
& nn.71-72 (1978).
17 Siegel v. Ragen, 180 F.2d 785 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 990 (1950); State v. McCray, 267 Md. 111,297
A.2d 265 (1972).
executive branch of government, including wide
discretion over routine prison matters.'8 In viewing
the prison as an administrative agency, courts ap-
plied the traditional "arbitrary and capricious"
standard of review,' 9 which gave much protec-
tion-in fact, conferred a presumption of
validity-to the officials' discretionary powers.
20
This theory has been subject to criticism for
treating prisons far more deferentially than other
administrative agencies,2 ' for circular reasoning,
2 2
for incorrectly imputing to legislatures the intent
to protect correctional discretion from review,2
and for abandoning judicial responsibility for en-
suring achievement of the goals underlying court
imposed sentences.H Two commentators have ar-
gued that courts act not in conflict with affirmative
legislative and executive programs but because of
the vacuum created by legislative and executive
inaction or neglect.25
Federal courts also frequently cited principles of
federalism as the basis for refusing to review pris-
oners' claims on the merits. 26 Yet in other kinds of
institutional litigation, federal courts have shown
proper respect for state considerations, without
refusing jurisdiction, by maintaining a deliberate
pace of litigation, seeking substantial guidance
from state officials, and coordinating enforcement
of decrees with the state defendants.
27
'8 Hill v. Estelle, 537 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1976); Childs
v. Pegelow, 321 F.2d 487 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 932 (1964); See Powell v. Hunter, 172 F.2d 330 (10th
Cir. 1949).
19 See Bethea v. Crouse, 417 F.2d 504 (10th Cir. 1969);
Douglas v. Sigler, 386 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1967); Smalley
v. Bell, 484 F. Supp. 16 (W.D. Okla. 1979); Breier v.
Raines, 221 Kan. 439, 559 P.2d 813 (1977); Sanchez v.
Hunt, 329 So. 2d 691 (La. 1976).
20 "People perceive remedies as arbitrary.., when they
do not really believe that the wrong to which the remedy
is addressed constitutes a serious evil." Eisenberg & Yea-
zell, supra note 16, -at 515.
21 See, Haas, supra note 13, at 800; Note, Beyond the Ken
of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the
Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506, 515 (1963).
The circular argument runs that administrative de-
cisions are not subject to judicial review because they are
administrative decisions and are therefore not subject to
review. Note, supra note 21, at 515.
23 See Kimball & Newman,Judicial Intervention in Correc-
tional Decisions: Threat and Response, 14 CRIME & DELIN-
QUENCY 1, 8 (1968).
2 Haas supra note 13, at 802.
25 Eisenberg & Yeazell supra note 16, at 496.
2
1 Ortega v. Ragen, 216 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1954), cert.
denied, 349 U.S. 940 (1955); Siegel v. Ragen, 180 F.2d
785. Contra, Fox v. Sullivan, 539 F.2d 1065, 1068 (5th Cir.
1976) (federal courts cannot avoid determining whether
prisoners' civil rights have been violated).
27 See Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 16, at 506.
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Concomitant with the separation of powers doc-
trine was the courts' acknowledgement of their lack
of expertise to administer prison affairs. 28 Critics
have considered this to be one of the weakest
arguments, for courts have interfered with the op-
eration of other institutions previously thought
beyond judicial expertise.2
Finally, courts predicted that anything less than
a total hands-off approach would undermine the
prisons' disciplinary systems, 30 and foresaw pris-
oners intentionally violating rules to defy the
guards, courts invalidating essential means for con-
trolling prisoners, and guards hesitating to act
decisively because of confusion over what practices
would be judicially acceptable.3' This argument
waned simply because of its indiscriminate use by
courts in cases in which the challenged practice
bore only an attenuated relationship to this sub-
version of discipline rationale.3 2 In addition, judi-
cial intervention has been seen as a means of
relieving tensions created by excessive or arbitrary
conditions and practices justified solely on grounds
of discipline.33
Other principles also played important roles in
preserving the hands-off doctrine. One was the
traditional distinction drawn by courts between
rights and privileges. In prison law, courts often
labelled all features of prison existence as privileges,
and consequently denied review3 4 A second policy
was the notion that "[l]awful incarceration brings
about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of
many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by
the considerations underlying our penal system."
28
28 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 407 (1974);
Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661, 670 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied sub noai. Sellars v. Beto, 409 U.S. 968 (1972).
29See Haas, supra note 13, at 809-10. See generally
Beger, supra note 12; Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 16.
See Ortega v. Ragen, 216 F.2d 561; Novak v. Beto,
453; F.2d 661; Note, supra note 21, at 521:
The objection is not formulated in terms of a fear
that the court will hold a regulation deemed essen-
tial to be void; rather, it is asserted that mere
assumption of jurisdiction over the subject matter
will of itself undermine prison authority and thwart
the authorities' efforts to fulfill the task of custody.
31 Haas, supra note 13, at 811; Note, supra note 21, at
521.
3 See Haas, supra note 13, at 811-13.
33 See generally Berger, supra note 12.
34 Childs v. Pegelow, 321 F.2d 487 (religious practices);
Siegel v. Ragen, 180 F.2d 785 (Illinois law deprives all
but liberty, life and property, including access to law
library); Powell v. Hunter, 172 F.2d at 331 (earned good
time credit).
a5 Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948). See also
cases cited in note 34 supra.
As will be seen, these principles retained their
vitality despite the demise of the traditional hands-
off doctrine.
B. EROSION OF THE HANDS-OFF DOCTRINE IN LOWER
FEDERAL COURTS
During the 1960s, the Supreme Court expanded
the rights of criminal defendants, but generally
ignored constitutional problems in correctional
law.36 However, the few relevant decisions rendered
by the Supreme Court, together with the emer-
gence of the entitlement doctrine in administrative
law, paved the way for increasing intervention by
the lower federal courts.
The hands-off doctrine suffered a major setback
when, in Cooper v. Pate,3 the Supreme Court rec-
ognized a state prisoner's right to bring an action
under § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 187138
against prison officials for first amendment viola-
tions. For some time thereafter the hands-off doc-
trine receded, while the courts chipped away at the
other doctrines supporting denial of jurisdiction.
The first doctrine to fall was the rights-privileges
distinction of administrative law.
Beginning with Goldberg v. Kelly, 39 the distinction
gradually faded as the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged the legitimacy of entitlements created by
state law,40 contract,4' or mutual understanding
from consistent practice.4 2 Once shown the ex-
istence of an entitlement, the Court balanced the
interests of the plaintiff and the defendant institu-
tion to determine necessary procedural safeguards
for that entitlement. This analysis eventually car-
ried over into prison law, first in the lower court
decisions, 43 then later in the Supreme Court's land-
mark decision of Wolff v. McDonnell."
With the increasing awareness of individual
rights came a direct assault on the withdrawal of
privileges doctrine in Coffin v. Reichard:45 "[a] pris-
oner retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen
except those expressly, or by necessary implication,
36 Berger, supra note 12, at 1.
- 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (per curiam).3842 U.S.C. § 1983 (1974).
2 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
40Id.
41 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972).
42 Id. at 601-03.
43 See, e.g., Clements v. Turner, 364 F. Supp. 270 (D.
Utah 1973).
4 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974) (inter alia, establishing
some basic rights of procedural due process for prisoners)
("There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitu-
tion and the prisons of this country").
45 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944).
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taken from him by law."4 6 That this statement
reflected the embryonic stage of a fundamental
change in the lower federal courts' attitude toward
prison litigation was demonstrated by the number
of later cases which echoed the same theme. With-
out expressly abandoning the hands-off doctrine
after Cooper v. Pate, lower federal courts modified it
by accepting jurisdiction over particular abuses
involving constitutional infringements which had
broad implications for various aspects of prison life.
A classic example of this approach is Edwards v.
Duncan,48 which held that a federal prisoner had a
cause of action for deprivation of medical care and
harassment by officials who sought to discourage
the prisoner from filing his suit. Noting that the
district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's claim was
based on the hands-off doctrine, the court of ap-
peals stated: "The hands-off doctrine operates rea-
sonably to the extent that it prevents judicial re-
view of deprivations which are necessary or reason-
able concomitants of imprisonment. Deprivations
of reasonable medical care and of reasonable access
to the courts are not among such concomitants,
however.,
49
Aware of the need for providing some access to
the courts for violation of prisoners' constitutional
rights, some courts also reversed the trend of prior
decisions 5° by ruling that the plaintiffs could use
habeas corpus proceedings to seek relief.5i In short,
although the Supreme Court had not yet pro-
nounced the death sentence upon the hands-off
doctrine, the lower federal courts were beginning
to assume its eventual demise.
5 2
4 6 Id. at 445.47 See, e.g., Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128
(N.D. Cal. 1972).
48 355 F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1966).
" Id. at 994. See also Washington v. Lee, 390 U.S. 333
(1968) (per curiam).
50 See text accompanying note 13 supra.
"' See State v. McCray, 267 Md. 111, 297 A.2d at 280
(1972) for citations. Ironically, McCray strictly adhered to
the hands-off doctrine despite a thorough discussion of
its erosion.
2 See, e.g., Pearson v. Townsend, 362 F. Supp. 207
(D.S.C. 1973) (denial of due process rights by disciplinary
board); Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt,
360 F. Supp. 676 (D. Mass. 1973), affld, 494 F.2d 1196
(1st Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Hall v. Inmates of Suffolk
County Jail, 419 U.S. 977 (1974) (cruel and unusual
punishment); Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128
(conditions for pretrial detainees constituted cruel and
unusual punishment). Cf In re Jordan, 7 Cal. 3d 930, 500
P.2d 873, 103 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1972) (rules which allowed
officials to examine contents of letters to lawyers ruled
unconstitutional).
C. ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN CREATING A NEW
HANDS-OFF DOCTRINE
Although earlier decisions such as Cooper v. Pate
and Johnson v. Avery 53 broke down the jurisdictional
barriers for prisoner's claims and signalled an end
to the traditional hands-off doctrine, the opinions
of the Supreme Court in the mid-1970s more fully
defined the still deferential relationship between
the judiciary and the prison administrators.
In Procunier v. Martinez," involving broad censor-
ship of inmates' correspondence, the Supreme
Court upheld the district court's jurisdiction to
review the first amendment issue. The Court ad-
mitted its lack of expertise in prison matters, but
believed its responsibility for addressing constitu-
tional violations was an overriding consideration.H
In order to decide on the constitutionality of the
prison regulations, the Court attempted to balance
the interests of the individual and state by estab-
lishing certain guidelines:
Censorship of prisoner mail is justified if the follow-
ing criteria are met. First, the regulation or practice
in question must further an important or substantial
government interest unrelated to the suppression of
expression.... Second, the limitation of First
Amendment freedoms must be no greater than is
necessary or essential to the protection of the partic-
ular governmental interest involved.so
Prisoners achieved a significant victory when the
Court invalidated the regulations as being in-
tended for suppression of expression without any
alternative legitimate purpose and as overly broad
even if a legitimate goal existed.57 In hindsight, it
may have been a Pyrrhic victory, for Martinez
expressly declined to rule that prisoners had any
communication rights, and instead based its hold-
ing on the outsiders' first amendment rights which
had been infringed by the regulations.H As a result,
the somewhat modified hands-off doctrine and its
companion, the withdrawal of privileges doctrine,
remained a serious barrier to the expansion of
prisoners' rights after Martinez.
The new hands-off policy assumed more shape
in Pell v. Procunier,59 which upheld regulations pro-
3 393 U.S. 483 (1969) (right of access to the courts).
'4 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
5 Id. at 405.
56Id. at 413. The court derived this test from the four-
step reasoning utilized in United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968), to analyze restrictions on "symbolic
speech."
57 416 U.S. at 415, 416.
58 Id. at 408.
59417 U.S. 817 (1974).
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hibiting face-to-face interviews between the press
and individual inmates specifically requested by
the press representatives. In an opinion written by
Justice Stewart, the Court distinguished Pell from
Martinez by pointing out that, in Martinez, the state
had failed to show any legitimate purpose for the
regulations. Here, recent incidents had led officials
to believe that the narrowly drawn regulation was
vital to institutional security. Also, alternative
means for communication remained open to the
inmates and members of the press, so that the first
amendment rights of all affected individuals were
not completely suppressed, as in Martinez.60 It is
important, in light of Wolfish, that the Court in
Pell placed great emphasis on deference to the
prison director's professional judgment in deter-
mining the necessity for such a regulation.6 Even
here, though, notions of judicial deference were
balanced with potential infringements on the con-
stitutional protections which the Court believed
were retained by the inmates.6
Also related to the emergence of a new hands-off
approach was Meachum v. Fano,63 in which the Court
held that a state prisoner was not entitled to a
hearing when transferred to another prison, absent
a state law or practice which conditioned the trans-
fer on proof of misconduct or other specified events.
The Court found that transfers often required no
more than the prison administrator's judgment as
to what would best serve institutional security or
the inmate's welfare.6 By making the scope of
constitutional liberty interests subject to state de-
termination, the Court avoided any review of the
basis for that determination, and diminished the
usefulness of the entitlement doctrine for prison
litigation.6
One commentator characterized the pattern in
correctional litigation prior to Wolfish as "some-
thing akin to a holding action."66 With the assist-
ance of Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union,
Inc.,6 Wolfish broke the holding pattern by reviving
many aspects of +he hands-off doctrine long
thought dead or dying.
60Iad at 826.
61 Id. at 825.
62Id. at 827.
63427 U.S. 215 (1976).
" Id. at 225.
6 See generally Comment, No Due Process Due Prisoners in
Intrastate Transfers: Due Process Imprisoned with the Entitlement
Doctrine, 38 U. Prrr. L. REv. 561 (1977). See also Berger,
supra note 12, at 8-9.
66 Berger, supra note 12, at 5.
67 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
III. ANALYSIS OF JONES AND WOLFISH
In Jones, state prison officials issued regulations
which permitted membership in the prisoners' un-
ion but prohibited inmates from soliciting other
inmates for membership, banned all union meet-
ings and barred delivery of union publications
mailed to the prison in bulk. A three-judge district
court, though not disputing the officials' sincere
belief in the union's potential threat to prison
discipline and control, nevertheless invalidated the
regulations because of the officials' failure to sub-
stantiate this fear.68 In an opinion by Justice Rehn-
quist, the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that
the district court had neither appropriately de-
ferred to the decisions of prison administrators nor
sufficiently appreciated the peculiar and restrictive
circumstances of confinement.'
Jones has been viewed as a significant departure
from decisions such as Pell and Martinez.70 However,
in light of Wolfish, Jones does not appear to be a
departure as much as a logical extension of the
earlier rulings, with the complementary doctrines
of withdrawal of privileges and judicial deference
playing a more important role.7' First, Justice
Rehnquist extinguished the doctrine of retained
rights which had appeared in Martinez and Pell,
albeit weakly, by making preeminent the supposi-
tion that "the fact of confinement and the needs of
the penal institution impose limitations on consti-
tutional rights, including those derived from the
first amendment, which are implicit in incarcera-
tion." 72 He judged the restrictions to be reasonably
related to the legitimate penological objectives,
particularly because the first amendment associa-
tional rights virtually eliminated by the regulations
were deemed inevitable victims in an institutional
setting.
73
Next, Justice Rehnquist expanded notions of
judicial deference to prison officials that had ap-
peared in Pell and Martinez as one of several consid-
erations for determining the reasonableness of first
amendment infringements.74 For example, relying
'' North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union v. Jones,
409 F. Supp. 937, 944 (E.D.N.C. 1976) (three-judge
district court), reo'd, 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
6 433 U.S. at 125.
70 Id. at 139-40 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Note, Jones
v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc.: The "Hands-Off
Doctrine" Revisited, 14 WAKE FoR= L. REv. 647 (1978).
7" See Berger, supra note 12, at 12, 13.
72 433 U.S. at 125.
73 Id. at 130, 132.
4 See Note, supra note 70, at 658-60.
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on broad propositions found in Pell, he emphasized
that first amendment infringements need only fur-
ther a legitimate institutional interest, 75 and that
the evaluation of whether a matter is detrimental
to prison management lies so appropriately within
the bounds of administrative discretion as to re-
quire the courts' deference to officials' judgment
unless substantial evidence shows an exaggerated
response.76 Absent from the opinion are any refer-
ences to Pelt's requirements for a limitation on first
amendment rights only as to time, place, and
manner77 or its consideration of whether alternative
means of communication were available. 78 Instead,
Jones shifted the burden of proof away from the
state by compelling the plaintiff to rebut the offi-
cials' general speculations as to the union's possible
disruption to orderly administration: "[i]t is
enough to say that they [the prison officials] have
not been conclusively shown to be wrong in this
view." 79 The sweeping language of Jones, the
Court's refusal to scrutinize the asserted state in-
terests, and its shifting of the burden of proof to
the plaintiff despite a first amendment infringe-
ment emphatically laid the groundwork for almost
absolute judicial deference to many aspects of
prison life.
Wolfish presented an opportunity to consider
several unresolved issues. Contrary to the more
typical suits involving long-established practices in
antiquated facilities, the Metropolitan Correc-
tional Center, an innovatively designed federal de-
tention center,'3 had been in operation for only
four months when inmates brought this suit in
district court.8' In an exhaustive opinion, Judge
Frankel held that numerous practices at the facility
were unconstitutional. 2 The Supreme Court was
to review the district court's injunctions prohibiting
double-bunking in a cell admittedly built for one
inmate, enforcement of the "publisher-only" rule,
75433 U.S. at 125.76 Id. at 128.
77417 U.S. at 826.
78 Id. at 824, 826. See also note 56 and accompanying
text supra.
7 433 U.S. at 132.
80 For a comprehensive description of the facility, see
United States ex rel. Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. 114,
119-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), af/'d, in part, rev'd in part 573 F.2d
118 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd sub nom. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520 (1979).
81 Id. The suit was brought on behalf of all detainees
and prisoners who were confined at the Metropolitan
Correctional Center. The issues that eventually reached
the Supreme Court concerned only the rights of detainees.82Justice Rehnquist noted that the district court had
enjoined 20 practices of the facility. 441 U.S. at 523.
limitations on packages received by inmates, un-
announced search of inmates' cells outside of their
presence, and visual body cavity searches without
probable cause.
Before addressing the plaintiffs particular com-
plaints, Judge Frankel advanced several arguments
favoring judicial intervention. As a general matter,
he noted that the federalism-based reluctance of
federal courts to interfere with state matters was
inapposite, since the plaintiffs were federal pris-
oners. According to Frankel, nonintervention here
would appear even more ludicrous, considering the
federal courts' recent activism in state prisoner
litigation.83 He next addressed the standard argu-
ment that federal statutes extended to prison offi-
cials the comprehensive control and almost com-
plete discretion over federal prisoners.ss Employing
the implication doctrine developed in J. . Case v.
Borake and later cases, he reasoned that the offi-
cials' statutory powers implied certain duties, the
enforcement for which implicitly lay with the in-
mates, as the intended beneficiaries of those du-
ties.
Turning to the underlying policies governing the
constitutional issues, Judge Frankel stated three
major principles, two of which were later rebuffed
by the Supreme Court: that judgments of prison
officials, "unless made arbitrarily or in conflict
with particular rights given by Constitution or
statute, are entitled to respect and probable final-
ity";8 7 that prisoners retain "all the rights of an
'
3Judge Frankel stated that "[i]t is at least implicit
that our duties are less constricted with respect to federal
prisoners." 439 F. Supp. at 122.
See text accompanying note 18 supra.
85377 U.S. 426 (1963). However, the vitality of Borak
must be questioned in light of recent Court decisions
denying iinplied private rights of action. See, e.g.,
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S.
11 (1979), and cases discussed therein.
86 439 F. Supp. at 122:
The powers import duties,.., and these obliga-
tions (to take care, protect, classify, provide suitable
quarters, and instruct) are not misconceived or dis-
torted if we describe them as intended to "benefit"
those locked up under federal authority. It is no
long step from that to infer that some rights-at
least against arbitrary, capricious, or unauthorized
treatment-accrue to the prisoners for whose man-
agement the statutes were written (emphasis in
original).
The opinion also refers to the Administrative Proce-
dure Act as support for permitting broader judicial re-
sponsibility with federal prisons. Id. Because the consid-
erations permitting greater judicial intervention in fed-
eral prisoner cases are beyond the scope of this Article,
the discussion of this issue has been omitted.
87ld. at 124.
[Vol. 71
THE CRY OF WOLFISH
ordinary citizen except those expressly, or by nec-
essary implication, taken from him by law";s8 and
that pretrial detainees, presumably innocent, are
not subject to deprivation of any rights beyond
those necessary to confinement, unless officials
show a compelling necessity.8
Though rejectingJudge Frankel's statutory basis
for judicial intervention,9 the Second Circuit af-
firmed that the detainees had been denied due
process of law.91 It upheld the district court's re-
quirement for the compelling necessity test in con-
nection with restrictions on detainees, but cau-
tioned temperance in light of the admonishment
in Martinez concerning the courts' inability to deal
with many problems in prison administration.9
2
In Wolfish, an opinion again written by Justice
Rehnquist, the Supreme Court reversed the Second
Circuit.93 The Court adopted a separate standard
of review for challenged conditions implicating not
a specific constitutional right, but only a liberty
interest under the fifth amendment: the proper
inquiry is "whether those conditions amount to
punishment."'' The compelling necessity test was
therefore inappropriate. Moreover, the Court
found the detainees' presumption of innocence to
be pertinent only for purposes of allocating the
burden of proof at the detainees' trials.95 The Court
was not as concerned with the effect of conditions 96
as with the question of punitive intent on the part
of the officials. To assess punitive intent, Justice
Rehnquist adapted the guidelines established in
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez97 for determining
8 Id.
8 Id Only the first principle was left intact-and
strongly so-by the Court.
9 Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d at 125. The court of
appeals criticized the district court for justifying its in-
volvement with trivial matters solely on the basis of
statutory jurisdiction.
91 Id at 126, :29, 130.
9Id at 124:
Accordingly, once it has been determined that
the mere fact of confinement of the detainee justifies
the restrictions, the institution must be permitted to
use reasonable means to insure that its legitimate
interests in security are safeguarded.
9 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520.
9 Id at 535.
"SId at 533.
9 "[I]t suffices to say that this desire to be free from
discomfort simply does not rise to the level of those
fundamental liberty interests delineated in cases such as
Roe v. Wade .... "Id at 534.
9 Id at 537-38 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Mar-
tinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963)):
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative
whether a legislative act was punitive or a permis-
sible regulatory restraint. Rather than discuss these
factors, however, he moved on to the central theme
of the opinion: even though a condition may be
punitive in nature, it may still be permissible if
rationally related to an alternative, legitimate pe-
nological objective.9 Contrary to the views ex-
pressed by the lower courts, the government's in-
terest in ensuring a detainee's presence at trial was
only one of several possible legitimate penological
interests justifying constitutional restrictions.99 Of
critical importance to the post-Wolfish courts was
the Court's admonition:
In determining whether restrictions or conditions
are reasonably related to the government's interest
in maintaining security and order and operating the
institution in a manageable fashion, courts must
heed our warning that "[s]uch considerations are
peculiarly within the province and professional ex-
pertise of corrections officials, and, in the absence of
substantial evidence in the record to indicate that
the officials have exaggerated their response to these
considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to
their expert judgment in such matters."'lo
Applying this analysis, the Court concluded that
the circumstances surrounding the double-bunking
at the facility-sharing toilet facilities and a sleep-
ing place in a seventy-five square foot cell for sixty
disability or restraint, whether it has historically
been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes
into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its
operation will promote the traditional aims of pun-
ishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the
behavior to which it applies is already a crime,
whether an alternative purpose to which it may
rationally be connected is assignable for it, and
whether it appears excessive in relation to the alter-
native purpose assigned are all relevant to the in-
quiry, and may often point in differing directions.
98 Id. at 538 (also quoting Mendoza-Martinez):
Absent a showing of an expressed intent to punish
on the part of detention facility officials, that deter-
mination generally will turn on "whether an alter-
native purpose to which [the restriction] may ra-
tionally be connected is assignable for it, and
whether it appears excessive in relation to the alter-
native purpose assigned [to it]."
99 Id. at 540:
It is enough simply to recognize that in addition
to ensuring the detainees' presence at trial, the
effective management of the detention facility.., is
a valid objective that may justify imposition of
conditions and restrictions of pretrial detention and
dispel any inference that such restrictions are in-
tended as punishment.
100Id. at 540-41 n.23 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417
U.S. at 827).
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days-did not constitute a violation of the detai-
nees' rights to due process.
1
Before addressing the security regulations affect-
ing specifically guaranteed constitutional rights,
Justice Rehnquist summarized four governing
principles articulated in earlier decisions: convicted
prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional protec-
tions;' °2 incarceration brings about the withdrawal
or limitation of rights and privileges; 10 3 maintain-
ing security and preserving internal order and
discipline may require limitation or withdrawal of
retained constitutional rights as well;"14 and courts
should give wide-ranging deference to prison offi-
cials' judgment, owing to their expertise as well as
to the legislative delegation of operational author-
ity to the executive branch.'0 5 Having grounded its
analysis in precedent, the Court proceeded to up-
hold each of the challenged practices as a rational
response to valid institutional concerns for security
and orderly administration.l06
In his dissent, Justice Marshall attacked several
points of the majority opinion which, not unex-
pectedly, were later to play a determinative role in
lower federal court decisions. After first denouncing
the minimal protection afforded detainees' liberty
interests under the punishment test, and the
Court's misapplication of its own test based on the
Mendoza-Martinez guidelines, Justice Marshall
criticized the Court's failure to enforce seriously
the second step of its analysis-determining
whether a particular imposition was rationally re-
lated to a nonpunitive purpose.10 7 In any event, he
believed that the Mendoza-Martinez guidelines were
inappropriate in this situation, for "the Due Process
Clause focuses on the nature of the deprivations,
not on the persons inflicting them. ' lss He accused
the Court of so blindly deferring to administrative
judgments on the rationality of the restrictions as
to have delegated to prison officials the judicial
Id. at 543.
'02 Id. at 545.
03 Id. at 545-46 (citing Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S.
266, 285 (1948)).
'4 Id. at 546, 547 (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at
823).
's Id. at 547, 548.
0'; For a complete summary of Bell v. Wolfish, see The
Supreme Court, 1978 Term, 93 HARV. L. REv. 60, 99 (1979).
See also Note, Fifth Amendment-Rights of Detainees, 70 J.
CRIM. L. & C. 482 (1979).
17 441 U.S. at 565 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
'08 Id. at 567.
responsibility for determining whether detainees
had been punished.' 9
Justice Marshall then advocated a balancing test
for determining the reasonableness of all restric-
tions, regardless of whether the affected rights were
implicitly or expressly guaranteed by the Consti-
tution. 10 In his view, the first amendment claim
regarding the "publisher-only" rule required some
consideration as to less restrictive alternatives."'
The limitation on packages, justified partly on
grounds of creating administrative burdens, was
seen as overly broad. Accepting, arguendo, the
majority's evaluation that less restrictive regula-
tions adopted in other institutions did not neces-
sarily define the constitutional minimum, Justice
Marshall still believed them to be effective in cast-
ing doubt upon the government's asserted justifi-
cations. 12 As to the most serious issue, body cavity
searches, he charged that the Court ignored an
examination of the particular facts in favor of
absolute deference to administrative convenience,
based on unsubstantiated claims of institutional
security."
3
The Wolfish majority's adoption of the Mendoza-
Martinez punishment test for evaluating implied
constitutional rights, together with the majority's
wide-ranging deference to prison officials even with
respect to explicit constitutional rights, accelerates
the clearly marked trend towards a presumptive
validity for prison regulations that began in Jones.
Assuming the inappropriateness of the punishment
test,"' it is in the Court's application of that test
and of the general balancing test previously used
for determining the constitutionality of prison reg-
ulations that Wolfish, buttressed by Jones, signals
the overall approach to be taken for inmate com-
plaints. As in Jones, the Court deftly avoided the
nuances of the precedents from which it derived its
guiding principles. Pell is particularly illustrative
'9Id. at 568.
"OId. at 571: "As the substantiality of the intrusion on
detainees' rights increases, so must the significance of the
countervailing governmental objectives." On the basis of
this balancing test, Marshall would have remanded on
the issue of double-bunking, because he did not believe
that the "compelling necessity" test was appropriate. Id.
at 571, 572.
"' Id. at 574. Significantly, he does not rely on any
first amendment prisoner cases decided by the Supreme
Court.
112Id. at 575.
113 Id. at 578.
114 Id. at 568, 569 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See The
Supreme Court, 1978 Term, supra note 106, at 105-06.
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of this process. In Pell, a first amendment case,
Justice Stewart reiterated the familiar language on
withdrawal of privileges, but he qualified this with
the corollary principle that "a prison inmate retains
those First Amendment rights that are not incon-
sistent with his status as a prisoner or with the
legitimate penological objectives of the corrections
system."" 5 He also stated that institutional security
was the central penological goal. However, rather
than simply accept at face value the purported
concerns for institutional securil,'he seriously eval-
uated whether under the specific circumstances the
existence of an alternative means of communica-
tion protected the plaintiff's first amendment rights
before upholding the prison regulations.'1 6 Never-
theless, Wolfish quoted Pell for the proposition that
courts should defer to the officials'judgment absent
substantial evidence of an exaggerated response on
their part.1 7 In context, Pell viewed this principle
as merely one of several relevant factors for consid-
eration.118
Wolfish departed significantly even from Jones
when the Court deferred so completely to admin-
istrative discretion that it ignored the facts of the
record before it. For example, circumstances at the
facility made it almost impossible to smuggle con-
traband after contact visits-visitors and their
packages were searched by metal detector, by flu-
oroscope, and by hand before they entered the
visiting room; contact visits were closely monitored
and restricted to a glass-enclosed room; and pris-
oners wore one-piece jumpsuits at all times." 9 The
Court still upheld the validity of body cavity
searches for contraband. In reaching this decision,
the Court referred to the considerations of the
fourth amendment balancing test-specifically, the
scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in
which it is conducted, thejustification for initiating
it, and the place in which it is conducted. 20 In
fact, however, the Court considered only that "a
"'417 U.S. at 822.
SId. at 823-28.
17 441 U.S. at 540-41 n.23. See text acompanying note
100 supra.
n8417 U.S. at 827.
" 44 1 U.S. at 577-78 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The
only incident of smuggling merely proved to the Court
the efficacy of the body cavity searches. Id. at 559.
12o Id. at 559 (citing United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S.
606 (1977); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543 (1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.
873 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Schmerber v. Cali-
fornia, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)).
detention facility is... fraught with serious security
dangers.'
121
By overlooking the particular facts and giving
weight only to purported institutional interests,
Wolfish has, in effect, shifted the burden of proof to
the inmate in all challenges to prison practices and
has imposed a presumptive validity on administra-
tive judgments. The result is the "granting of vir-
tually unreviewable discretion to correctional offi-
cials on questions involving the constitutional
rights of inmates, ' 'is and a withdrawal of rights
without balancing the actual reasonable needs of
the institution with the intrusion on the inmates'
asserted constitutional interests.
Jones and Wolfish have thus established a new
hands-off doctrine: the Court will not deny juris-
diction, but the negative results based on the prin-
ciple of wide-ranging deference to administrative
discretion will now achieve the same result as the
previously discredited jurisdictional bar.12
IV. IMPACT OF WOLFISH
Lower federal courts have generally shown a
favorable reaction to Wolfish's deferential ap-
proach, but are not following blindly in the Su-
preme Court's steps. Characteristic of many deci-
sions is a respect for the complex issues requiring
more than a general pronouncement or total defer-
ence to even genuine institutional concerns. For
this reason, Wolfish has not created an absolute bar
to consideration of constitutional violations
deemed worthy of vindication, although the courts
differ greatly on which rights sufficiently warrant
judicial intervention.
A. IMPLIED CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
In attempting to evaluate the proper scope of
rights not explicitly granted to detainees by the
Constitution, courts have focused on Wolfish's pun-
ishment test and the following passage:
21441 U.S. at 559. See also id. at 559 n.40, where the
Court dismissed any less restrictive alternatives as "sim-
ply ... not... as effective."
22 Berger, supra note 12, at 20.
12
3 Id. S also The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, supra note
i06, at 108:
The Court in Bell v. Wolfish failed to recognize
that its constitutional duty to uphold the due pro-
cess rights of citizens must take precedence over its
reluctance to immerse the judiciary in the operation
of detention centers. This failure suggests that the
Court will hesitate to infer the presence of imper-
missible punishment unless faced, in its own words,
with a case of "loading a detainee with chains and
shackles and throwing him in a dungeon."
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A court must decide whether the disability is im-
posed for the purpose of punishment or whether it
is but an incident of some other legitimate govern-
mental purpose .... Absent a showing of an ex-
pressed intent to punish on the part of detention
facility officials, that determination generally will
turn on "whether an alternative purpose to which
the restriction may rationally be connected is as-
signable for it, and whether it appears excessive in
relation to the alternative purpose assigned to it.' 2'
Although the "nonpunitive intent" standards
would not be an appropriate defense against suits
brought by state or federal prisoners on eighth
amendment grounds, courts have relied heavily on
Wolfish's deferential attitude in rejecting prisoners'
claims that had not been specifically grounded in
the Constitution. 12 5 As in Wolfish, 1 26 many of the
decisions in this area do not closely scrutinize the
rationality of the officials' actions if plaintiffs have
not shown substantial evidence of an exaggerated
response.
27
On the basis of this standard, courts have ruled
that state officials have no constitutional obligation
to provide methadone or alcoholic treatment pro-
grams or eye examinations for detainees, absent a
showing of the already high standard of "deliber-
ate indifference to serious medical needs of pris-
oners.""ts The Third Circuit in particular stressed
the legitimacy of the officials' concern for prevent-
ing disruptions caused by inmates who might seek
illegal access to methadone.sas
Wolfish also has had substantial impact on the
highly litigated issue of overcrowding. With the
exception of Ramos v. Lamm, 1a0 which declared con-
ditions at a state facility to be unconstitutional,
recent cases have followed Wolfish in rebuffing
124 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 538. See note 99 supra.
'25 See, e.g., Lynott v. Henderson, 610 F.2d 340 (5th
Cir. 1980) (ban of visit by married woman justified for
maintaining orderly administration in view of husband's
threats to sue if she were permitted to visit).
126 See text accompanying notes 107-09 supra.
'27 See, e.g., Gray v. Lee, 486 F. Supp. 41 (D. Md. 1980)
(prohibition against interest-bearing prison account is
based on substantial interest in preventing the free-flow
af currency inside the penal institution and is not an
exaggerated response. Court will defer to officials' judg-
ment).
i2s Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 612
F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979); Pace v. Fauver, 479 F.
Supp. 456, 460 (D.N.J. 1979); Holly v. Rapone, 476 F.
Supp. 226, 231 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (all citing Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)).
i29 Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 612
F.2d at 761.
130 485 F. Supp. 112 (D. Colo. 1979).
claims of overcrowding or complaints regarding
the size of the cell.i1l The courts' reluctance to
interfere in this matter absent egregious circum-
stances is best demonstrated in Jordan v. Wolke, 
132
which held constitutional a ninety square foot cell
for four detainees that was joined by a day room
containing 350 square feet. While acknowledging
the average floor space per inmate to be smaller
than that challenged in Wolfish, the court did not
believe that fact to be a material distinction suffi-
cient to show punitive intent or genuine hard-
ship."aa In contrast, the dissent did find significant
distinctions. Unlike Wolfish's correctional facility,
the jail was composed of traditional cells with bars
and extremely stark surroundings, and there was
no room to walk in the cell if the other occupants
were present.'3 4 A contrary result was reached in
Burks v. Teasdale,"s5 which affirmed the district
court's order eliminating overcrowded conditions
in the Missouri State Penitentiary. The Eighth
Circuit, though approving of the deferential spirit
of Wolfish, 136 nevertheless found conditions in the
state facility to be so distinguishable from the
federal facility of Wolfish as to warrant judicial
intervention.
3 7
When compelled to address issues that involve
implied constitutional rights, federal courts appear
to be adopting the Wolfish emphasis on withdrawal
of rights and deference to administrative discretion
as the focal point of any analysis. Arguably, the
right to a drug treatment program and a reasona-
bly sized cell would promote rehabilitation and
orderly management of an institution as effectively
as other rights being given more serious consider-
ation by the courts, yet many courts have chosen
131 Jordan v. Wolke, 615 F.2d 749 (7th Cir. 1980) (state
detainees); Bono v. Saxbe, 620 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1980)
(50 square foot cell for inmates in "Control Unit"); Smith
v. Sullivan, 611 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1980) (district court's
limitation on population premature; remanded for fur-
ther hearings); Epps v. Levine, 480 F. Supp. 50 (D. Md.
1979) (50 square foot cell for two detainees with extremely
limited time out of cell held not punitive or clearly in
excess of legitimate governmental interests of security
and order).
132 615 F.2d 749.
"3Id. at 753.
'm Id. at 754-55.
"s 603 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1979) (double-ceiling in 65
square foot cell unconstitutional in these circumstances).
136 Id. at 62.
137 Id. at 62-63 n.5: "We think that a good deal may
depend on the type of institution involved, the nature of
the inmates, and the nature of the confinement itself. Cf
Bell v. Wolfish."
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to demarcate the bounds of permissible judicial
intervention at this point. Although this line-draw-
ing appears somewhat arbitrary, the courts' treat-
ment of these matters reflects the pattern seen in
all public institutional litigation: the ranking of
certain social goals above others and a tendency to
defer to administrative expertise when dealing with
matters distantly related to immediate wrongs
which caused judicial intervention initially. 1.
B. STRIP SEARCHES AND WOLFISH
Wolfish resolved a conflict among the circuits'39
when it upheld the right to conduct nonabusive
visual body cavity inspections on less than probable
cause. 4° Although the Sixth Circuit has treated
this holding as a jurisdictional bar to complaints
concerning strip searches, 14 1 other courts have
shown some sensitivity in balancing the purported
institutional interests against the serious invasion
of the inmates' personal rights. In Hurley v. Ward,1
42
the Second Circuit disagreed with the district
court's injunction against visual body cavity
searches of all state inmates without probable
cause, but upheld the injunction as it pertained to
the specific plaintiff, who had conclusively dem-
onstrated abusive procedures directed at him.
Though decided before Wolfish, this case recog-
nized that the Supreme Court required particular
deference to the exercise of informed judgment by
state prison officials. 1 3 Following the Supreme
Court's decision in Wolfish, the district court, on
review, distinguished Hurley on its facts-the plain-
tiff was routinely subjected to strip searches though
there had been no contacts with nonprison person-
nel and even when he had been manacled and
constantly observed throughout the incident trig-
gering the search-and paid obeisance to Wolfish
only to the extent of modifying the order to permit
routine visual body cavity searches after contact
visits with outside personnel.' 44
Although generally responsive to the officials'
needs to ensure security and maintain a stable
1-8 See Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 16, at 509, 515.
'39 441 U.S. 520, 524 n.2 (1979).
'40Id. at 560.
141 Pierce v. Jago, 615 F.2d 1362 (6th Cir. 1980) (un-
published opinion) (complaint of visual cavity search on
less than probable cause is unsubstantial; federal law
gives officials total discretion).
142 448 F. Supp. 1227 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd in part, 584 F.2d
609 (2d Cir. 1978), modiied on remand, No. 77 Civ. 3847
(S.D.N.Y. November 9, 1979).
143 584 F.2d at 611 (citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416
U.S. 396, 405 (1974)).
'4 No. 77 Civ. 3847, slip op. at 1.
administration, the Seventh Circuit in Bono v.
Saxbe145 could not accept the reasonableness or
rationality of strip searches before and after non-
contact visits with family and friends. Wolfish's
rationale was inapposite since it pertained to
searches following contact visits. Rather than sim-
ply ban this procedure, however, the court re-
manded to give officials an opportunity to show a
rational relationship to the legitimate goal of se-
curity.
4 6
Hurley and Bono portend a reluctance to disturb
procedures designed to promote security unless
absolutely necessary by insisting on a case-by-case
review, and then providing officials with every
opportunity to defend themselves. For instance, the
Bono court chose to remand the case without ques-
tioning why the officials had chosen not even to
discuss this major issue in their court papers. Iron-
ically, this individualized approach will probably
increase litigation, rather than reduce it.
C. CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHTS NOT
ADDRESSED BY WOLFISH
The courts' applications of Wolfish with respect
to rights specifically guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion differ markedly, depending on their willing-
ness to accept the standardjustifications of security,
orderly administration, and discipline asserted by
prison officials. One court, dissatisfied with the
blanket statement given by officials, described the
dilemma experienced by every court:
The Court's task is not an easy one. While deferring
to the jail administration, the Court must still ensure
that the administration's response to problems is
"reasonable". The Court must be especially alert
when the alleged justification for an administration
decision is institutional security, because literally
any restraint could be justified on the ground of
increased security. A naked man in chains in a bare
cell poses no risk. From that point on, every increase
in freedom brings at least some decrease in security.
Every decision in a prison environment involves the
weighing of lesser or greater restraint against the
increased or diminished chances of contraband or
escape. While the Court may not substitute its
judgment as to the proper balance of these factors,
it must be satisfied that the balance struck by jail
authorities is reasonable. The ambit of the admin-
istrators' discretion and judgment may be wide-
but it is not unbounded. The Court is not to usurp
the role of the jailer. But it cannot abandon its role
as a proper forum for adjudication of the rights of
prisoners. The final judgment as to what is reason-
'45 620 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1980).
146 1d., at 617.
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able or not lies here. Whether a particular restriction
is reasonably related to the security or other legiti-
mate objective of a jail facility depends upon the
aim of the restriction, given the situation faced by
administration of the particular institution, and the
magnitude of the restriction as weighed against the
desirability of the goal. It is almost impossible to
decide that issue removed from the actual conditions
of the particular jail house. 47
The courts' dilemma in applying Wolfish has
been particularly acute when determining specific
constitutional rights not addressed by Wolfish. One
open question is whether there is a constitutional
right to contact visits.' 4 8 Since Wolfish, two courts
have upheld the prohibition against contact visits
for detainees as a reasonable response to the insti-
tution's security interest and as rationally related
to the prison's legitimate goals of preserving secu-
rity and order. Mirroring Wolfish, the courts dis-
missed the existence of less restrictive alternatives
to a total ban as irrelevant. 4 9 A third court held
the ban against visitation by the children of de-
tainees and prisoners unconstitutional, viewing
with skepticism the officials' judgment that such
visitation was not in the best interests of the chil-
dren.' 
°
Courts also appear to be relying heavily on
Wolfish in first amendment cases. Perhaps they
view Wolfish's stress on the validity of concerns for
security as the finishing touch on the trend to
substantially restrict the inmates' first amendment
rights which began withJones. Or it may simply be
attributable to the variety of claims being brought
to the courts. Since Wolfish, the courts have seen
few situations in which the relationship between
the contested prohibition and the legitimate pe-
nological goals was clearly tenuous."'i Two federal
prisoner cases have held that prison regulations
prohibiting correspondence with inmates at other
facilities 52 and barring distribution of a political
publicationsS were reasonable both in their scope
147 Valentine v. Englehardt, 474 F. Supp. 294, 300-01
(D.N.J. 1979).
148441 U.S. at 559-60 n.40.
149 Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 612
F.2d 754; Jordan v. Wolkie, 615 F.2d 749 (7th Cir. 1980).
'50 Valentine v. Englehardt, 474 F. Supp. at 301.
'5' In fact, only one among the several cases discussed
below, St. Claire v. Cuyler, might be characterized in this
manner. 481 F. Supp. 732 (E.D. Pa. 1979). See also, 482
F. Supp. 257 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
152 Schlobohm v. United States Attorney General, 479
F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Pa. 1979) (wide range of legitimate
reasons: transfer for safety reasons frustrated by corre-
spondence from first prison to new prison; conduit for
planning escapes or disrupting of prison's operations).
' Goodson v. United States., 472 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D.
and purpose. Each decision made reference to Wol-
fish's deferential legal standard, but relied mainly
on the test established in Procunier v. Martinez"r that
gave broad discretion to officials to impose censor-
ship. The combination of Wolfish and Martinez has
thus led to inevitable results.
State prisoners' claims have fared no better, with
the exception of St. Claire v. Cuyler. 55 In St. Claire,
the district court ruled that the prohibition against
the wearing of a Muslim hat (kufi) was an exag-
gerated response to the purported need for efficient
administration of the prison and protection of the
public interest, even if Wolfish were applicable, and
it was not. 56 Similarly unreasonable was the bar
against attendance at chapel service because the
plaintiff had been placed in segregation for wearing
his hat. The court also ignored Jones by applying
the least restrictive means test.
1 57
A unique problem containing first amendment
issues was posed to a Pennsylvania federal district
court: does a long-term inmate who is a child
molester and who has been segregated in the max-
imum-security housing unit for his own safety hold
the same rights as regular inmates? As to the first
amendment claims, the court answered, not en-
tirely.iss It found that the plaintiff's access to reli-
gious services and other activities outside of the
unit would require two guards and result in a
strain on the facility's manpower. The court noted,
however, that the defendants asserted no security
justification for limiting the frequency of the plain-
tiff's religious exercise or access to reading material.
Therefore, the prison was required to arrange for
visits by the chaplain and delivery of legal and
educational material to the plaintiff's cell. na
Of particular interest is the two-sided argument
advanced by the officials in defending the claims
in this case. First, they contended that the plain-
tiff's fears were subjective, so that he waived his
Mich. 1979) (federal law has delegated the responsibility
of deciding appropriate reading material to Bureau of
Prisons; courts cannot interfere).
'5 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974) (restriction must promote
a substantial interest unrelated to suppression of expres-
sion; and the regulation must be no greater than is
necessary to protect that interest).
's481 F. Supp. 732. Cf Chapman v Jago, 615 F.2d
1359 (6th. Cir. 1980) (summary denial of right to attend
services for inmate in segregation because of security
problems).
" 481 F. Supp. at 739 n.13.
157 Id. at 739.
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rights as a regular inmate when he chose segrega-
tion. The court rebutted this argument with ex-
amples of incidents in which convicted child mo-
lesters, typically despised by the rest of the prison
population, had been attacked. Basing much of its
reasoning on the entitlement doctrine, the court
stated:
Prison authorities may not condition the rights,
privileges or opportunities of a prisoner who is
objectively in danger of violent assault upon his
renunciation of his Eighth Amendment right to be
protected reasonably from violence directed at him
by other inmates, except to the extent the Wolfish-
grounded security considerations allow.
16 °
Alternatively, the officials expressed fear of dis-
ruptions if the plaintiff were permitted more priv-
ileges than the other inmates in the unit.161 Not
only did the court believe anticipation of prisoner
resentment to be an exaggerated response to secu-
rity interests, but it also found that the granting of
privileges to selected inmates in the housing unit
was commonplace and without incident. 1 2
The courts appear to have remained receptive to
claims of cruel and unusual punishment, whether
the claims are challenges to individual practices or
are complaints based on the totality of the circum-
stances. Whether Wolfish's recognition of the need
for judicial supervision over eighth amendment
claims'6 has induced this receptivity is difficult to
ascertain; it is clear, though, that the deferential
spirit of Wolfish has tempered many of the recent
decisions in this area.
16
4
Two eighth amendment cases decided on the
basis of the totality of the circumstances reached
contrary results. Ramos v. Lamm iSs alluded to the
deference required by Wolfish, but held that the
conditions of the entire facility were cruel and
unusual punishment.'6 In Smith v. Sullivan, 167 a
'60Id. at 1306.
I16 These privileges included leaving his cell more than
one hour per day and furnishing his cell with a chair or
desk.
16 480 F. Supp. at 1296, 1298. Defendants justified
denial of a chair on grounds that it might be used as a
weapon. The court noted that the defendants had pro-
vided the plaintiff with a sledgehammer and other heavy
tools as part of his employment with the housing unit. Id.
at 1298.
i63 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979).
l" See generally Kaufman, Foreword, in 2 PRISONERS'
RioHrs SOURCEBoox: THEORY, LITIGATION, PRACTICE ix-
xi (I. Robbins ed. 1980). "[F]or the foreseeable future
[wide-ranging deference to prison officials] is to be the
hallmark of prisoners' rights cases." Id. at xi.
1s 485 F. Supp. 122 (D. Colo. 1979).
" The court distinguished Wolfish as follows:
Texas district court which had imposed a limita-
tion on the prison population and ordered a weekly
report on improvements of conditions was chided
by the Fifth Circuit for premature intervention
and involvement with minutiae. The court of ap-
peals remanded for reconsideration in light of Wol-
fish.
Litigation over use of mechanical restraints and
tear gas highlights the courts' struggle, in the after-
math of Wolfish, to accommodate the legitimate
concerns of safety and security while preventing
cruel and unusual punishment. A particularly good
example is Spain v. Procunier, 168 which held that (1)
the use of tear gas was appropriate if (a) used in
nondangerous quantities, (b) no more convenient
or safe control method was available, and (c) fea-
sible steps were taken to protect those inmates who
were not the object of the tear gas; (2) as to the
specific plaintiffs, the prison had to cease using
neck chains while the plaintiffs were in the prison's
confines and possibly even out of prison, but the
use of other mechanical restraints, e.g., leg manacles
or waist chains, while outside of the prison, was
permissible; and (3) denial of fresh air and regular
outdoor exercise for the specific plaintiffs consti-
tuted cruel and unusual punishment. In Spain, the
state argued that judicial interference was inappro-
priate in light of the dangerous nature of the
plaintiffs. Though sympathetic to the problems
associated with keeping dangerous men in safe
The question ... as framed by Justice Rehnquist
for the [Wolfish] majority, was whether conditions
at 'the [Metropolitan Correctional Center]
"amount[ed] to punishment of the detainee" in
violation of Fifth Amendment due process. [441
U.S. at 535.] For a convicted inmate, on the other
hand, confinement in a penal institution is punish-
ment, and it is the execution of that confinement
which is subject to the Eighth Amendment's prohi-
bition of cruel and unusual punishment.
Id. at 153 n.19 (emphasis in original).
'67Smith v. Sullivan, 611 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1980).
The areas addressed by the district court concerned
exercise programs, education and rehabilitation, medical
treatment, food service, personnel, and ventilation and
lighting. Cf Bono v. Saxbe, 620 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1980),
which remanded for a determination of whether poor
lighting in cells of the "Control Unit" was truly justified
by the defendants' claim that the inmates would use
extra light bulbs as weapons.
'68 600 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1979). Cf Bono v. Saxbe,
620 F.2d 609 (handcuffing of inmates in the "Control
Unit" whenever outside of cell is permissible); Roudette
v. Jones, 101 Misc. 2d 136, 420 N.Y.S.2d 616 (Sup. Ct.
1979) (prison regulations concerning use of physical re-
straints for security held constitutional, but constant use
of restraints whenever the plaintiffs were out of cells was
abuse of regulations).
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custody under humane conditions, the court re-
minded the state of the federal court's ultimate
duty to eliminate cruel and unusual punishment,
citing Wolfish as support. 16 9 Hesitant to encroach
on administrative discretion where the officials'
fear of violence was genuine, the Ninth Circuit
granted relief against certain practices only as they
applied to the plaintiffs, except for its general
prohibition against using lethal amounts of tear
gas. Even then, the court would not have held in
favor of the plaintiffs but for the fact that they had
already been subjected to neck chains and lack of
exercise for such a lengthy period of time (four-
and-one-half years).7'
In Stewart v. Rhodes, 171 prison officials of a state
facility used mechanical restraints to tie disruptive
inmates to their beds. Often the inmates remained
tied down in the same straddled position for several
days, unclothed, without sheets and lying in their
own waste. Defendants called this practice a "con-
trol measure" for inmates who had caused disturb-
ances, assaulted guards, flooded cells, attempted
escapes or suicide, and set fires. 172 Believing that
the defendants could find less drastic means for
controlling behavior, the court granted a prelimi-
nary injunction until they submitted proposed
guidelines for future use of restraints.
173
Of interest is the important role played in Spain
and Stewart by the complementary doctrines of
deference and withdrawal of privileges. The Spain
court, unwilling to extend its holding beyond spe-
cific practices affecting particular plaintiffs, glossed
over the question of which rights, if any, were
retained by prisoners, for the reason that "whatever
rights one may lose at the prison gates ... the
Eighth Amendment most certainly remains in
force.' ' 174 In undertaking to change a major policy,
the Stewart court, in contrast, declared that, despite
Wolfish, inmates were not stripped of all constitu-
tional rights, and proceeded to pay more than lip
service to a balancing test between the plaintiff's
constitutional rights and the institution's need for
security.
175
i69 600 F.2d at 194.
170Id. at 197, 199.
17 473 F. Supp. 1185 (S.D. Ohio 1979).
'72 See id. at 1190-93.
'
731 Id. at 1193, 1194.
'74 Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 193-94.
175 473 F. Supp. at 1187 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974)). The court also held that
the practice of racial segregation at the reception center
was unconstitutional. Defendants had argued the appro-
priateness of deference, because segregation was necessary
at the reception center due to insufficient information on
the new inmates, many of whom had been transferred to
D. THE ROLE OP STATE COURTS
Possibly Wolfish will spur litigants to seek a more
favorable forum in the state courts. The scarcity of
state cases involving Wolfish issues at this point
limits the usefulness of any prediction. However,
one important pro-prisoner case has recently come
down in De Lancie v. Superior Court. 176 Without
guidelines or probable cause, officials conducted
electronic surveillance within the county jail, ran-
domly monitoring and recording private conver-
sations among detainees and between detainees
and their visitors. The information was used by
law enforcement agencies in criminal proceedings
against the detainees and others. The defendants
claimed that detainees posssessed no reasonable
expectation of privacy. The court held this practice
to be a violation of the state-afforded constitu-
tional right to privacy, and remanded to give the
defendants an opportunity to show a compelling
governmental necessity for monitoring every room
of the facility.
177
Notable is the court's rebuff of Wolfish. First, it
maintained the distinction between the detainee
and the prisoner.
[U]nlike the sentenced inmate, the singular objec-
tive underlying pretrial detention is to assure the
presumptively innocent detainee's presence at
trial.... Though subject to the physical restraint on
liberty incident to confinement, the detained citizen
does not automatically forfeit his basic civil rights
as soon as the jailhouse door clangs shut. Cf Bell v.
Wolfish. 178
Second, it required surveillance to be operated
in the least intrusive manner, since privacy is a
specifically protected state constitutional right, and
cited Cooper v. Pate in support. 179 Finally, having
the facility for race-related incidents. The court was not
persuaded-the defendants had no basis for comparison,
since the center had been segregated for ten years. Id. at
1189.
17697 Cal. App. 3d 519, 159 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1979),
hearing granted by California Supreme Court.
177 97 Cal. App. 3d at 530-31, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 27:
While it can be rationally argued that the detai-
nee's (and visitor's) right of privacy within the
context of private expression may be reasonably
burdened in furthering necessary objectives of insti-
tutional security and public safety, we cannot con-
ceive-without more-of any compelling need to en-
gage in such wholesale, indiscriminate intrusion into
the area of a detainee's private conversation, partic-
ularly in the visiting room (emphasis in original).
178 Id. at 26.
'79 Id. at 26-27.
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noted Wolfish's policy of withdrawal of rights, the
court remarked: "As a matter of general policy,
state prison inmates are accorded private visitation
rights governed by applicable rules and regulations
subject to restriction only as may be necessary in
individual instances to maintain institutional security




The number of pro-institution cases decided in
the past year-and-a-half and the very few un-
qualifiedly pro-inmate decisions occurring during
the same period suggest that the cry of Wolfish has
been heard and welcomed in the federal courts.
180Id. at 26 n.7 (emphasis in original).
Yet the reluctance to intrude on prison manage-
ment and acquiescence in the prisons' withdrawal
of important interests were already deep-seated in
prisoner cases prior to Wolfish. 18 1 One problem in
determining Wolfish's impact at this time is that,
with the exception of some eighth amendment
claims, few of the complaints are clearly substantial
constitutional violations. Doubtless Wolfish has
weighted the already precarious constitutional bal-
ancing test in favor of the institutional interests,
but the decisions do not yet indicate a willingness
to ignore the facts before the courts. In short, the
courts have not yet bestowed upon the prisons'
asserted justifications the presumptive validity that
Wolfish seemed to invite.
181 See text accompanying notes 53-67 supra.
